Abstract-We use a controlled invariance approach to design a semi-autonomous lane departure assist system that is guaranteed to keep the vehicle in the lane. The controlled invariant safe set is the set of system states from which an input exists that can keep the vehicle in the lane. First we provide theoretical conditions under which this set has a simple characterization and can be computed in real-time. We then use this characterization to derive a feedback strategy that keeps the vehicle in the lane and overrides the driver only if he/she could otherwise force a future lane departure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of autonomous vehicles has made rapid progress over the past 30 years, yet there remain important challenges, among which the ability to verify that systems can operate safely and robustly. Nevertheless, already today it is possible to benefit from this progress via semi-autonomous safety systems. A good example are lane departure assist systems (LDAS) which already on their own have a large potential benefit for improving traffic safety. According to the NHTSA FARS database [15] , in 2013, 12,703 people died in the United States after a lane departure, i.e. 42% of all traffic fatalities were preceded by a lane departure.
Most major car manufacturers are currently offering some type of lane departure assistance. The spectrum ranges from pure warning systems to systems that proactively keep the vehicle in the center of the lane. These are vision based systems that use the vehicle position in the lane, its heading and a limited look-ahead horizon (based on the sensor capacity) to determine whether a warning or steering input is necessary, see for instance [5] . The drawback of such a design is that it does not provide formal safety guarantees.
Approaches which guarantee that the vehicle will stay in the lane can be found in the autonomous driving literature. Such safety tools are in general referred to as lane keeping assistance systems, since they actively try to keep the vehicle in the center of the lane. One way to achieve this objective is to consider the lane keeping task as stabilization problem, where one tries to keep the distance to the center equal to zero [8] , [18] . Notice that in these approaches the longitudinal speed is assumed to be constant. In a related approach [19] , a two level architecture is proposed. The higher level uses a model predictive control scheme to determine a safe (meaning in the lane) state trajectory. The lower level controller then tracks this trajectory. Another stability-based approach using Lyapunov functions and a potential field was *This work was in part supported by NSF CPS Award number 1239182. 1 Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA, + hoehener@mit.edu presented in [17] . It is also shown that this approach is robust under bounded time-varying disturbances.
When designing driver-assist systems such as LDAS, a crucial question is how the system should interact with the driver. Studies show that the acceptance of systems that provide assistance in lane keeping is higher for systems that interfere less with the driver's steering [7] . The present work focuses on the design of a LDAS that is guaranteed to keep the vehicle in the lane while overriding the driver only when necessary to do so. The difference with the above cited approaches is that here we apply control input only when a lane departure is imminent, while the other approaches continuously apply steering to keep the vehicle near the center of the lane.
The major challenge in designing such a system is that it requires a procedure that allows to identify the system states from which there exists a steering input that can keep the vehicle in the lane. The set of these states is called controlled invariant safe set. Determining whether a state is in this set (a safety verification task) often requires computationally intensive algorithmic procedures. Therefore the application of controlled invariance to real-world engineering problems has been limited to systems with special structures or small dimensions, see [2] , [6] , [10] and references therein. Here we show that under certain conditions, that we specify, the controlled invariant safe set has a simple characterization that can be computed efficiently online. We therefore propose a system architecture that performs an initial safety check at the time the driver requests activation of the LDAS. If activation is safe (based on the above mentioned conditions), the system is enabled and continuously monitors the driver's steering inputs. The driver's inputs are overridden only if necessary to keep the vehicle in the lane.
The remainder of the paper starts with a discussion of the model and the formal statement of the problem. Section III contains the description of the proposed driver-assist system. The implementation is discussed in Section IV which is followed by some concluding remarks.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We start this section with a description of the lane departure assist system (LDAS) that we want to design. In the second part of the section we introduce the model and provide a formal problem statement.
A. Lane Departure Assist
We consider a vehicle equipped with sensors, for instance a camera, that are able to determine the vehicle's distance from the left and right lane boundary, denoted by d l and d r respectively. In addition we assume that measurements on the vehicle's dynamics are available. In particular we assume the vehicle's sensors provide measurements of the longitudinal and lateral velocity U and V , yaw rate r and heading angle ψ, see Figure 1 . Notice that estimates of yaw rate and lateral velocity could be obtained from measurements of lateral acceleration, see for instance [9] . The LDAS then uses this information to override the driver when a lane departure is imminent. It is therefore a semi-autonomous vehicle function that should act only when otherwise safety cannot be guaranteed. We call such a vehicle function a safety supervisor. Here we consider the case of a straight lane, see Assumption 1 below. Moreover, LDAS is restricted to use either right steering to avoid crossing the left lane boundary or left steering to avoid the right lane boundary and it cannot change the vehicle's speed, i.e. the longitudinal velocity U must remain constant during interventions of LDAS. In this setting the requirements for the safety supervisor are:
• Guarantee that the car remains in the lane at all times;
• Least conservative; meaning that the driver's steering input should be overridden only when necessary to prevent a lane departure. Traditional lane departure warning systems use the distance to the lane boundaries to determine whether a warning has to be given to the driver, see for instance [12] . However, in general such an approach cannot guarantee safety as there are vehicle states from which the left steering needed to avoid crossing the right lane boundary might force the vehicle to eventually cross the left boundary. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . For a provably safe design it is therefore important to guarantee that a steering override applied to prevent crossing one lane boundary will never cause an unavoidable lane departure on the opposite boundary.
B. Notations and vehicle-lane dynamics
The vehicle dynamics take place in the continuous state space X ⊂ R 6 . In the following we will use a body-fixed reference frame that is fixed to the ego-vehicle's center of gravity, see Figure 1 . All dynamical interactions will be described within this reference frame. The major simplifying assumption that we make is that the road lane is straight.
Assumption 1: (i) The road lane is straight at all times; (ii) The lane width W > 0 is known and constant. The system states are (see Figure 1) • (U, V ) -longitudinal and lateral speed along, respectively perpendicular to the vehicle's path; • (r, ψ) -yaw rate and heading angle with respect to a fixed reference frame; • τ w ∈ [−τ w ,τ w ] -wheel torque which represents brake torque if it is negative andτ w > 0 is some constant;
is some constant. The full system state will be denoted by
For the vehicle dynamics we use a standard model, see for instance [16] . A description of the constants of the dynamical model is given in Table I .
Notice that we use the standard abbreviations c f = µc f 0 and c r = µc r0 . For a set A ⊂ R n , S(A) denotes the set of piecewise continuous signals with images in A. The flow of the dynamical system x : (1) with τ w and δ f replaced by t w (t) and d f (t) respectively. The component functions of the flow x are denoted by x i , i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and represent the trajectories of the corresponding state. For instance, x 4 (t; t w , d f , x) is the vehicle's heading angle at time t, when the vehicle was controlled by t w and d f and in state x ∈ X at time 0.
The model of vehicle dynamics is valid only under normal driving conditions, see for instance [1] , i.e.
• Front and rear slip angles, denoted by β f and β r , are such that tan(β f ) ≈ β f , respectively tan(β r ) ≈ β r ; • Lateral tire forces can accurately be approximated by a linear model; • The matrix in the lateral dynamics (1) is stable;
• Rolling and pitching motion of the car can be neglected. To formulate these requirements in an explicit assumption, first recall that in our model the front and rear sideslip angles are given by
Front and rear tire slip angles, which shall be denoted by α f and α r , are functions of the steering angle and the front and rear sideslip angles,
Under good road conditions lateral tire forces can be accurately approximated by a linear model as long as the tire sideslip angles satisfy −π/18 ≤ α f , α r ≤ π/18, see for instance [16, p. 202 ]. Assumption 2:
Assumption 2 (i) assures the stability requirement and is satisfied by cars and trucks, see [13, Sec. 6] . The second assumption guarantees small sideslip and tire slip angles respectively. For a more detailed discussion on the validity of this model see for instance [1] , [16] .
C. Problem statement
As described in Section II-A, the objective is to guarantee that the vehicle remains in the lane for all time. Hence the safe set, that is, the set of all states x ∈ X that are in the lane, is given by
In the following safety will always mean that the system state x belongs to the safe set S. Since we investigate a semiautonomous LDAS, we seek a feedback control strategy that keeps the state x in S for all time and overrides the driver steering only when necessary to do so. Such a feedback strategy will be called a safety supervisor. The principle is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Driver Vehicle and Lane Dynamics
Supervisor: Is driver input safe?
Diagram shows the interaction between safety supervisor and driver. The system state is x, driver's and supervisor's input are denoted by (τ d w , δ d f ) and (τ s w , δ s f ) respectively. The supervisor's feedback control strategy π s equals the driver's input whenever this input is safe.
Problem 1: Let x ∈ X be the current system state. Find a feedback strategy π s :
such that the corresponding flow satisfies x(t; π s , x) ∈ S ∀ t ∈ R + . We use in the following the convention that π
when the supervisor is inactive.
III. LANE DEPARTURE ASSIST SYSTEM
In this section we provide a solution to Problem 1. Assumption 1 shall hold throughout this section, hence the road lane is straight.
A. System architecture
As discussed in Section II-A, when overriding the driver the safety supervisor is restricted to keep the longitudinal speed constant and to use the following steering strategies: 1. Steer left to avoid right lane boundary; 2. Steer right to avoid left lane boundary. Since the focus in this paper is on steering control, to satisfy the requirement on longitudinal speed we assume:
Assumption 3: For every given longitudinal speed U , there exists a (feedback) torque input τ s w that allows to keep the longitudinal speed constant at U .
In practice such a torque input could be obtained from cruise control. Drivers can change the longitudinal speed whenever they are not overridden by the safety supervisor.
Recall that for a provably safe design that respects the above mentioned restrictions it is important to assure that the steering required to prevent the crossing of one lane boundary will not cause an unavoidable crossing of the other, see Figure 2 . Finally, as discussed in Section II-B, the dynamical model is only valid when Assumption 2 holds true. To enforce these constraints in a semi-autonomous manner, we propose an architecture that has three main components, see Figure 4 .
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Driver switches LDAS on 
Is enabled? Fig. 4 . Block diagram of the LDAS. The sets W + and W − are defined in (3) . The system has a number of design parameters that have to be validated offline before the safety supervisor is guaranteed to keep the vehicle safe.
The first component is an initialization check, performed when the driver first tries to switch on the LDAS. The role of this check is to guarantee that the safety supervisor is not enabled while the driver is performing an extreme maneuver. Mathematically this corresponds to the conditions outlined in Figure 4 , where U min , U max ,Ṽ ,r andψ are design parameters of the system. The appropriate selection of these parameters is discussed in Section III-C. Only if the initialization check is successful the system is enabled.
The second component is a status update, which continuously monitors whether the driver is keeping the speed and front wheel steering angle within the allowed range of operation, [U min , U max ] and [−δ f ,δ f ] respectively. Hereδ f is a design parameter. The necessity of this check comes from the fact that the system does not actively constrain the driver's wheel torque requests or front wheel steering angle. Instead, if the check fails the LDAS is disabled.
The last component is the actual safety supervisor. It checks whether the driver's input will lead to an unavoidable lane departure and overrides the driver when this is the case. The next Section III-B is devoted to a detailed discussion of this supervisor and contains the statement of the formal safety guarantees in Theorem 3.1.
B. Safety supervisor
In this section we design the feedback strategy π s that provides a solution to Problem 1. The design requires three conditions that are introduced and discussed in the following three paragraphs. These conditions can be checked offline as described in Section III-C. In the fourth paragraph we formally define π s and elaborate on the safety guarantees that it provides.
1) Range of operation of the system: Throughout this sectionτ w andδ f are positive constants as in Section II-B. Similarly, in accordance with the previous Section III-A, U min , U max ,Ṽ ,r andψ are positive constants. The choice of these constants is the subject of the next section. Define the reachable set of the lateral dynamics as follows:
An over approximation of the reachable set is any set Ω ⊂ R 2 such that R(Ṽ ,r) ⊂ Ω.
Condition 1:
(i) There exists an over approximation R of R(Ṽ ,r) such that
(ii)
< U min ≤ U max . Notice that if the longitudinal speed remains within [U min , U max ] and the steering input in [−δ f ,δ f ], then (i) guarantees that Assumption 2 (ii) is satisfied. Condition (ii) is a stability requirement, assuring that the lateral velocity and yaw rate reach their steady state in finite time.
2) Separation of steering tasks: In general it is not possible to consider the objectives: 1) stay left of the right lane boundary; 2) stay right of the left lane boundary; as independent control tasks, see Fig. 2 . In the following we provide a condition under which a decoupling of these tasks is possible. Hence this condition allows to design a safety supervisor that respects the restrictions on the steering actions that were imposed in Section II-A.
First, for all x ∈ X, t w ∈ S([−τ w ,τ w ]) and d f ∈ S([−δ f ,δ f ]) we introduce the slightly altered state trajectoryx(·; t w , d f , x) which for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is defined by 
where for a given set A, A denotes its closure and the control
Here τ s w is the torque input from Assumption 3 that allows the safety supervisor to keep the longitudinal speed constant. Since the torque required to do this is bounded, we will assume in the following that |τ s w | ≤τ w . Intuitively, the set W + is the controlled invariant safe set for the right lane boundary, that is, the set of states such that there exists an admissible steering input that keeps the vehicle on the correct side of the lane boundary. The set W 0+ is illustrated in Figure 5 . The sets T − (x), W − and W 0− are defined analogously, withx 6 , andd f replaced byx 5 and −d f respectively. It is intuitive that applying control only when a lane departure is imminent corresponds to overriding the driver when the supervisor's trajectory touches the lane boundary, i.e. when the current state is either in W 0+ or W 0− . We show that this is indeed a safe control strategy, see Theorem 3.1, if the following condition is satisfied.
Condition 2: W 0+ ∩ W 0− = ∅. Notice that in practice this condition assures the non occurrence of the situation depicted in Figure 2 .
3) Finite look-ahead horizon: The sets W + and W − are based on a prediction on the time horizon T + and T − . As this time horizon is finite but we want to keep the vehicle in the lane on the infinite horizon R + , we need to ensure that at the end of the look-ahead horizons T + and T − there still exists a steering input that can keep the vehicle in the lane. As we show in Theorem 3.1 below, this is the case if the following conditions hold true:
Condition 3:
where for a set A, A c denotes its complement.
The condition simply reflects that we require the car to have a limited turning radius.
4) Safety supervisor:
We assume that all previously mentioned conditions are satisfied.
Theorem 3.1:
Then the corresponding flow satisfies for every t ∈ R + such that
A few remarks are in order. First notice that the conditions on x 0 correspond to the initialization check of the LDAS, see Figure 4 . Thus if the initialization check is successful, then by (4) the vehicle is in the lane, as long as the longitudinal speed x 1 (t; π s , x 0 ) ∈ [U min , U max ]. That the safety guarantee only holds when the longitudinal velocity remains in [U min , U max ] corresponds to the status update of the LDAS, Figure 4 . Moreover, by the definition of τ s w the longitudinal velocity remains constant when the safety supervisor overrides the driver. Finally, as we discuss in detail in Section IV, implementing this supervisor only requires to check whether a state is in W + or W − respectively. It follows directly from the definition of these sets that this test can be done by simple integration. Pseudo-code is provided in Section IV and the proof can be found in [11] .
C. Bounds safety verification
Conditions 1-3 all impose some requirements on the design parameters U min , U max ,Ṽ ,r,ψ andδ f . Consequently, before the supervisor introduced in the previous section can be used to guarantee safety online, one has to verify offline that for the given choice of design parameters these conditions are satisfied. This verification process is depicted in Figure 6 and has two parts.
Offline Online
Design parameters:
•Ṽ ,r,ψ.
Parameter verification
Compute over approximation of reachable set R(Ṽ ,r)
Approximation of reachable set R First one has to compute an over approximation R of R(Ṽ ,r). This is a well studied topic, see for instance [3] , [14] , therefore we do not go into details here. Important considerations concerning the implementation are provided in Section IV-B.
Then one uses R to check whether Conditions 1-3 hold true. For Condition 1 this is straightforward. To check Condition 2-3 we introduce two auxiliary optimization problems, the value of which will then allow to formulate sufficient conditions for these assumptions.
Consider the nonlinear optimization problem Minimize s∈R+,t∈R+,x∈Xx
subject to
It will be convenient to define the value of problem (5),
Notice that V 1 is well defined since 0 is obviously a lower bound and the set of feasible points is closed. Proposition 3.2: If V 1 > 0 then Condition 2 holds true.
To check Condition 3 consider the problem
As above we define the value of problem (7) by V 2 := min −x 6 (t;t w ,d f , x) t, x satisfy (8a)-(8b) .
As standard arguments allow to show that T + (x) is bounded for all feasible x ∈ X, it is easy to see that the set of feasible points is compact and non empty. The value V 2 is therefore well-defined. Proposition 3.3: If V 2 > 0 then Condition 3 holds true. The proofs of these propositions are straightforward and therefore omitted.
As depicted in Figure 6 , if the parameter verification fails one has to revise the parameter choice. By Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, the verification fails if either V 1 or V 2 is too small. Tightening the active constraints of the corresponding optimization problems (5) and (7) will usually increase the value and thus eventually lead to valid parameters.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The LDAS described in Section III has two main parts. Before the system is put into operation, we have to find a set of parameters that is safe according to the test outlined in Figure 6 . Using a verified set of parameters, the safety supervisor depicted in Figure 4 runs online to keep the vehicle safe. In the following we provide details on the implementation of these two parts.
A. Safety supervisor
The logic diagram of the full algorithm is depicted in Figure 4 . Here we focus on the implementation of the safety supervisor block, that is, on the implementation of the feedback strategy given in Theorem 3.1. For the purpose of discretization we use a fixed step size ∆t > 0 and perform a forward Euler approximation in order to compute the state that would result by applying the driver input (τ
Checking whether this state is in W + ∩W − is simply done by integration. Pseudo code is provided in Algorithm 1. Notice that in Algorithm 1 we abbreviate (1) byẋ = f (x, τ w , δ f ).
B. Design parameter verification
As discussed in detail in Section III-C, the parameter verification requires to find an over approximation of R(Ṽ ,r) and the solution of the optimization problems (5) and (7) . There exist already many tools for these tasks. We would however like to stress that in order to have safety guarantees, one needs to use tools with guaranteed accuracy. To be precise, for the reachable set we need a guaranteed over approximation. Similarly, for the optimization problems we need to find a guaranteed lower bound of the values V 1 and V 2 . Such bounds can be provided by global optimization algorithms, see for instance [4] .
C. Simulations
We implemented Algorithm 1 in Matlab and used it to prevent lane departures of a simulated driver with a tendency to drift to the right. The result of the simulation is shown in Figure 7 . In the simulation we represent the center of gravity of the car by a red circle and its heading by a black arrow. The safety supervisor keeps the center of gravity between the solid blue lines. At 3.15s the driver is overridden to avoid a lane departure. When the danger is averted control is given back to the driver. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We used a formal approach to design a semi-autonomous lane departure warning system. The core of this system is a safety supervisor that uses the controlled invariant safe set to determine when to act. This guarantees both safety and that the driver is overridden only when necessary. Moreover, the supervisor is computationally efficient and easy to implement. The design of the supervisor is based on a number of parameters that have to be verified before safety can be guaranteed. It was shown that this verification can be done algorithmically.
The most restrictive assumption that we made is that the lane is straight. In future work this assumption should be relaxed. In addition, it was assumed that the system dynamics could be modeled accurately. As in practice these dynamics are subject to uncertainties and disturbances, the design should be extended to accommodate bounded uncertainties. Finally, it would be desirable to have an algorithm that allows to revise the parameter choice automatically when the parameter verification fails.
